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China’s Human Rights Footprint in Africa 
TIMOTHY WEBSTER* 
A significant amount of recent scholarship and com-
mentary accuses China of plundering the African con-
tinent, coddling its dictators and flouting labor and 
environmental standards.  This Article makes the 
counterintuitive claim that, despite irrefutable cases of 
abuse, China’s engagement with Africa has actually 
improved the human rights conditions of millions of 
Africans.  First, it places China’s abuses in context, 
showing that they differ little from the abuses and pat-
ronage politics of the major Western powers.  Second, 
it examines the evolution of international relations be-
tween China and various African countries, from the 
exportation of political revolution in the 1950s and 
1960s, to the promotion of human capital in the 2000s 
and 2010s.  Third, it catalogs the many recent contri-
butions in the educational, agricultural, infrastructur-
al and medical fields that China has made to African 
development.  By challenging the dominant narratives 
on both theoretical and empirical grounds, I call for a 
reexamination of a critically important, but often mis-
understood, pattern of interactions between China and 
Africa, a nexus that is shaping world affairs and per-
ceptions in unprecedented ways. 
 
 
 * Director of East Asian Legal Studies, and Assistant Professor of Law, Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law.  I appreciate the comments and feedback from 
participants at various conferences and seminars, including The New Scramble for Africa? 
Contemporary Formations between Asia and Africa, Yale University, April 23, 2010; 
Institute for African Development Seminar Series, Cornell University, April 21, 2011; and 
Expanding Critical Spaces in International Law, Whittier Law School, March 23, 2012.  I 
owe a special debt of gratitude to Professor James Gathii for his insightful comments and 
critiques of this Article.  Finally, I would like to thank Dean Lawrence Mitchell of Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law for generous summer research support. 
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INTRODUCTION 
China’s recent engagement with Africa has elicited copious 
commentary from the West, much of it negative.  International me-
dia,1 think tanks,2 NGOs,3 bloggers,4 academics,5 government offi-
cials (elected and appointed),6 international financial institutions7 and 
 
 1. Howard W. French, The Next Empire, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 13, 2010, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/05/the-next-empire/8018/.  French’s 
account is relatively even-handed, but he too insists on likening China’s strategy to former 
European colonial powers, in this case Germany.  See id.  More typical is The Economist, 
which states “China is coddling dictators, despoiling poor countries and undermining 
Western efforts to spread democracy and prosperity.”  See The New Colonialists:  China’s 
Hunger for Natural Resources is Causing More Problems at Home than Abroad, 
ECONOMIST (Mar. 13, 2008), http://www.economist.com/node/10853534.  
 2. Princeton N. Lyman, China’s Rising Role in Africa:  Presentation to the US-China 
Commission July 21, 2005, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jul. 21, 2005), http://www. 
cfr.org/china/chinas-rising-role-africa/p8436 (noting China’s new ties with “unstable” and 
“political[ly] controvers[ial]” states such as the DRC, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe). 
 3. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, INVESTING IN TRAGEDY: CHINA’S MONEY, ARMS, AND 
POLITICS IN SUDAN (Mar. 2008), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/pdf/080311-cah-investing-in-tragedy-report.pdf. 
 4. Bloggers deploy a bit more nuance.  See Andrew Leonard, China in Africa: Not 
Playing Fair? Western Mining Companies Complain to Mommy About China’s Bad 
Behavior, SALON (Jan. 29, 2007, 12:20 PM), http://www.salon.com/2007/01/29/china_ 
mining/. 
 5. The proximate cause of this article was a 2010 address delivered by Robert 
Rotberg of Harvard University in which he cataloged China’s actions in Africa.   
 6.  Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned of a creeping “new colonialism” in 
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others have assailed China’s range of initiatives to invest, trade, arm, 
train, loan, extract, sell, experiment or otherwise interact with Africa.  
In the dominant discourse, China’s objectives in Africa are essential-
ly exploitative, extracting the continent’s natural resources to feed 
China’s edacious growth.  Second, Chinese support for Sudan, Zim-
babwe, Angola, Guinea and other unsavory regimes abets poor gov-
ernance.8  Third, by degrading the people, land and water of Africa 
through predatory labor practices, environmental destruction and vio-
lent suppressions, China is exporting its own worst practices to Afri-
ca.9 
Western analysts frequently maintain that China is colonizing 
Africa.  This overstates the case, I argue, and misapprehends both the 
nature of China’s multifaceted relationships with fifty African coun-
tries, and the underlying meaning of its presence.  It is not merely the 
irony of London,10 Paris,11 Brussels or other former imperial powers 
 
Africa from foreign investors, which was widely interpreted to refer to China.  Matthew Lee, 
Hillary Clinton Warns Africa of ‘New Colonialism’, HUFFINGTON POST (June 11, 2011, 
12:21 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/11/hillary-clinton-africa-new-colonial 
ism_n_875318.html.  According to leaked diplomatic cables, Assistant Secretary of State 
Johnnie Carson wrote that China is a “pernicious economic competitor with no morals” and 
“is not in Africa for altruistic reasons.”  Susan Stumme, Leaked US Cable Says China has 
‘no morals’ in Africa, AFP (Dec. 8, 2010), available at http://news.theage.com. 
au/breaking-news-world/leaked-us-cable-says-china-has-no-morals-20101209-18r9a.html.  
Former UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw listed China among the ten biggest challenges 
facing Africa, next to poverty, terrorism and regional conflict.  CANRONG JIN, BIG POWER’S 
RESPONSIBILITY:  CHINA’S PERSPECTIVE 118 (Tu Xiliang, trans., 2011). 
 7. World Bank President, and architect of the Iraq War in the Second Bush 
Adminsitration, Paul Wolfowitz expressed concerns to the French media about China’s 
ignoring human rights abuses and environmental degradation in Gabon, among other places.  
See Paul Wolfowitz, ‘Il ne faut pas que la Chine commette les erreurs passées de la France 
et des Etats-Unis,’[China does not need to commit the past errors of France and the United 
States] LES ECHOS (Oct. 24, 2006), http://www.lesechos.fr/24/10/2006/LesEchos/19779-41-
ECH_--il-ne-faut-pas-que-la-chine-commette-en-afrique-les-erreurs-passees-de-la-france-et-
des-etats-unis--.htm; World Bank President Attacks China over African Lending Practices, 
IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT (Oct. 25, 2006), http://www.ihs.com/products/global-insight/industry-
economic-report.aspx?ID=106598789&pu=1&rd=globalinsight _com#. 
 8. Peter Godwin defines “politicide” as “the practice of wiping out an entire political 
movement . . . .  The murders here [in Zimbabwe] are accompanied by torture and rape on an 
industrial scale, committed on a catch-and-release basis.  When those who survive, terribly 
injured, limp home . . . they act like human billboards, advertising the appalling 
consequences of opposition to the tyranny.”  Michiko Kakutani, Where Dissidents Are the 
Prey, and Horror is a Weapon, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2011, at C1.  See also PETER GODWIN, 
THE FEAR: ROBERT MUGABE & THE MARTYRDOM OF ZIMBABWE 43 (2010). 
 9. JOSHUA KURLANTZICK, CHARM OFFENSIVE: HOW CHINA’S SOFT POWER IS 
TRANSFORMING THE WORLD 163, 170–71 (2007).  
 10. See, e.g., Damian Grammaticas, Chinese Colonialism?, BBC NEWS (July 19, 
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accusing Beijing of colonialism.12  The PRC actively supported anti-
colonial movements in many African countries during the 1960s and 
1970s.13  Instead, such criticisms overlook both the historical dimen-
sion of Sino-African relations and the current emphases of the Sino-
African nexus.  China’s developmental assistance, military support 
and terms of engagement hark back to the 1950s, but address Africa’s 
contemporary concerns and needs in ways that the West has largely 
overlooked. 
The larger point, however, is that we simplify Sino-African 
relations at our own risk.  If we think China is simply draining Africa 
of natural resources while buttressing its dictators, we ignore most of 
China’s activity in Africa, including direly needed contributions to-
wards Africa’s economic development.  At the same time that West-
ern countries and financial institutions dial back aid to Africa, China 
is actually increasing its financial, agricultural and technical assis-
tance.14  In so doing, China has won plaudits from African dictators 
 
2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18901656; David Blair, Why China is Trying 
to Colonise Africa, TELEGRAPH, Aug. 31, 2007, http://www.telegraph. 
co.uk/comment/personal-view/3642345/Why-China-is-trying-to-colonise-Africa.html; Conal 
Walsh, Is China the New Colonial Power in Africa?, GUARDIAN, Oct. 28, 2006, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2006/oct/29/china.theobserver. 
 11. The French, perhaps more in touch with their own colonial past, prefer the term 
neocolonialism (néo-colonialisme) to describe Sino-African relations.  See, e.g., PHILLIPPE 
RICHER, L’OFFENSIVE CHINOISE EN AFRIQUE [THE CHINESE OFFENSIVE IN AFRICA] 135, 148 
(2008);  Emmanuel Guérin, Bailleurs Emergents:  Ou en Est La Chine en Afrique? 
[Emerging donors:  Where in Africa is China?], 228 AFRIQUE CONTEMPORAINE 
[CONTEMPORARY AFRICA] 105, 107 (2008). 
 12. It is problematic for Western powers to accuse China of “colonialism,” given 
American, Belgian, French, British, Italian, German, Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch 
colonialisms from the mid-seventeenth century to the late twentieth century.  China, by 
contrast, has not colonized any part of Africa.  Unlike former colonial powers, China 
actually pays for the resources it extracts, through infrastructure projects, cash, preferential 
loans or other forms of payment.  Indeed, it is tempting to make the counterfactual argument 
that had the colonial powers actually invested in developing Africa’s infrastructure during 
their centuries of colonization, China would have a much smaller presence in Africa right 
now. 
 13. For example, China armed groups in Namibia, Zaire (the present D.R.C) and 
Rwanda during the 1960s, and set up a guerilla training camp in Burundi.  Warren 
Weinstein, Chinese Aid and Policy in Central Africa, in SOVIET AND CHINESE AID TO 
AFRICAN NATIONS 145, 146–61 (Warren Weinstein & Thomas H. Henriksen eds., 1980).  In 
the 1970s, China armed a young guerrilla fighter named Robert Mugabe, and provided 
assistance to UNITA in Angola.  See Elias Isaac, The West’s Retreat and China’s Advance 
in Angola, in CHINESE & AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA 163, 163 (Axel 
Harneit-Sievers et al. eds., 2010). 
 14. See Chen Jun, Xiong Zhengyi & Liu Hongpeng, Zhongguo Bujian Fanzeng Dui 
Fei Yuanzhu Tisheng qi Fan Jingji Weiji Nengli [China Does Not Decrease, But Rather 
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and democrats alike, from countries like resource-rich Sudan, but al-
so countries without significant natural endowments like Mauritius 
and Mali.15  It is not just Robert Mugabe and Omar Al Bashir who 
like the Chinese, but a host of democratically elected leaders, such as 
former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia,16 President Paul 
Kagame of Rwanda,17 former President Abdoulayeh Wade of Sene-
gal,18 President Jacob Zuma of South Africa19 and former President 
Bingu wa Mutharika of Malawi.20 
China’s support for despotic regimes must surely enter into 
the discussion of its human rights footprint.  But a more nuanced as-
sessment of China’s presence in Africa must also include the hun-
dreds of infrastructure projects, agricultural experiments, educational 
facilities, pilot projects and other components of Beijing’s Africa pol-
icy.21  Due attention to other areas illuminates the breadth of China’s 
 
Increases, Its Assistance to Africa, Raising Its Ability to Weather the Economic Crisis], 
XINHUA (Feb. 20, 2009), http://www.qhnews.com/index/system/2009/02/20/002969211 
6.shtml. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Prime Minister Zenawi has long criticized Western aid practices in Africa.  But 
when he paired criticism of the West with praise for China, it certainly captured the Chinese 
media’s attention.  According to China’s official news agency, the Prime Minister stated, 
“We are very comfortable to see China’s increasing influence in Africa.  So for Africa, the 
influence of China is not a source of concern or danger.  African countries are happy to see 
the rise of China.”  See Xiong Sihao, Ethiopian PM: China not looting Africa, XINHUA (Oct. 
16, 2008, 6:18 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-10/16/content_5210162.htm. 
 17. President Kagame repeated Zenawi’s opprobrium for the West, and praise for 
China.  In an interview with a German newspaper, he said that “[t]he Chinese bring what 
Africa needs: investment and money for governments and companies,” whereas Western aid 
“has not brought Africa forward.”  See China praised for African links, BBC NEWS (Oct. 
11, 2009, 8:54 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8301826.stm. 
 18. See Communique:  Hu Jintao Talks with President of Senegal Wade, MINISTRY OF 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (June 23, 2006), http://www.fmprc. 
gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t259893.htm. 
 19. See Cheng Guangjin & Wu Jiao, Zuma praises China’s Africa role, CHINA DAILY 
(Aug. 26, 2010, 8:00 AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2010-08/26/content_11203 
802.htm.  President Zuma likewise played China off of the West:  “China is there discussing 
with the brothers and sisters in Africa to create a mutually beneficial kind of relationship . . . 
different from former Western colonialists (simply) taking things by force.”  Id. 
 20. Malawian president meets senior CPC official on relations, PEOPLE’S DAILY (Mar. 
5, 2011, 9:57 AM), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7308973.html.  
Many on this list have also been characterized as “strong men,” not exactly steadfast 
supporters of democratic institutions such as free and fair elections or independent courts.  
But they did assume the reins of power through democratic elections. 
 21. China is, of course, a disaggregated entity, and thus the “Chinese presence” in 
Africa actually refers to representatives of national ministries (Commerce, Foreign Affairs, 
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engagement with Africa, generates insights into China’s “develop-
mental diplomacy,” and elucidates the human rights implications of 
China’s foreign policy.  This Article attempts to move beyond mutual 
recrimination by introducing Chinese perspectives into the discussion 
of Sino-African affairs. 
The goal is not to justify China’s presence in Africa—not that 
such justification is necessary—but to reorient the discussion by us-
ing terminology and historical understandings familiar to China, and 
the Global South more generally.  It is misguided to assume all for-
eign countries approach Africa in the same way.  Former colonial 
powers like France, Britain, Italy and Portugal relate to African coun-
tries in ways that reflect their unique histories.  For example, on the 
eve of the Arab Spring, France offered to dispatch security forces to 
prop up then-troubled Tunisian dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali,22 
revealing a paternalism deeply embedded in the former colonial rela-
tionship between the two countries.  French airstrikes in Mali, con-
ducted in response to a request from Malian President Traore, like-
wise indicated that the colonial past is less distant than perhaps once 
thought.23  Moreover, Italy hesitated to join the NATO bombing of 
Libya, ostensibly because of its colonial ties,24 more specifically to 
protect both countries’ bilateral investments.25 
 
Education, Health, Agriculture), national banks (Exim bank), provincial-level infrastructure 
companies, private entrepreneurs, laborers and a host of others.  Unfortunately, the dominant 
discourse still speaks of “China’s presence in Africa.”  By and large, similarly expansive 
language is not used to describe U.S. interactions with Africa.  Discussions of the U.S. 
presence in Africa tend to avoid ExxonMobil, McDonald’s or Starbucks, though each 
operates in various African states. 
 22. French Foreign Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie offered to send French security 
forces to quell protests in Tunisia.  She boasted of France’s “savoir-faire, recognized 
throughout the world, of [French] security forces to settle security situations of this type.”  
See Roula Khalaf & Scheherazade Daneshkhu, France Regrets Misjudgment Over Ben Ali, 
FIN. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/68bef0c2-232a-11e0-b6a3-00144feab 
49a.html#axzz2Lrp8L9T2.  One can only imagine the uproar that would greet a Chinese 
offer to send security forces, even more famous than the French, to quell African riots. 
 23. The French airstrikes came significantly in advance of a UN-backed military 
intervention, originally planned for September, 2013.  Both the United States and United 
Kingdom have supported the French military efforts.  See Angelique Chrisafis et al., France 
Launches Air Strikes on Mali, GUARDIAN (Jan. 11, 2013, 4:39 AM), http://www.guardian. 
co.uk/world/2013/jan/11/france-launches-airstrikes-on-mali (noting British support for 
France’s “assistance to [the] Government of Mali”); France Pushes on with Mali Air 
Strikes, GUARDIAN (Jan. 15, 2013, 2:37 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/15/ 
mali-french-air-strikes (describing U.S. support for French forces). 
 24. Italy to Take Part in Bombing Raids over Libya, FOX NEWS (Apr. 25, 2011), http:// 
www.foxnews.com/world/2011/04/25/italy-bombing-raids-libya/. 
 25. Libya’s sovereign wealth fund owns single-digit ownership interests in several 
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China has no former colonies in Africa, but its current ap-
proach to fifty African countries reflects historical interactions, as 
well as its own developmental needs.  Injecting Chinese and South-
ern perspectives into the debate leavens the discussion, destabilizes 
Western assumptions about Africa and highlights the ways that China 
is exporting—and could do more to export26—its own developmental 
model to compete with Western ones.  The emphasis on infrastruc-
ture, creation of special economic zones, interest-free loans and other 
features characterize China’s own economic rise.  At a time of 
heightened fiscal tightness in the developed world,27 China keeps 
pouring investment, people and equipment into Africa.  Perhaps it is 
time to see if China can teach the West about working with Africa.  
At the very least, we need to grapple seriously with the proposition 
that China provides a meaningful, and increasingly popular, alterna-
tive to western sources of aid, expertise and developmental assis-
tance. 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  The first part examines 
 
large Italian corporations, such as Banca Roma, Fiat Motor Company and the Juventus 
Football Club.  Contrariwise, ENI—Italy’s largest oil company—has invested billions in 
Libyan oil interests.  Factbox:  Italy and Libya Share Close Investment Ties, REUTERS (Feb. 
20, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/20/us-italy-libya-factbox-idUSTRE71J1N 
N20110220. 
 26. Professor Gathii points out that African countries could obtain additional benefits 
from China’s presence if China engaged in technology transfer and skills training, and 
opened its internal market to Africa exports.  See James Thuo Gathii, Beyond China’s 
Human Rights Exceptionalism in Africa:  Leveraging Science, Technology and Engineering 
for Long-Term Growth, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 664 (2013).  While I agree with this, I 
believe the initiative for seeking such advantages must be taken by the African leaders and 
entrepreneurs who negotiate the contracts, or by African legislators who draft its foreign 
investment laws.  China promulgated its own laws and regulations in the 1980s to induce 
transfer of advanced technology.  See generally Paul B. Birden, Jr., Technology Transfer to 
China:  An Outline of Chinese Law, 16 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 413, 438–440 (1994).  
Western countries did not hand over patent rights or production formulae out of beneficence, 
but because Chinese law obliged them to do so.  
 27. Italy and France failed to make payments to a fund devised at the 2005 Gleneagles 
Summit to target extreme poverty.  By 2009, Italy had made only 3% of the necessary 
payments, while France had lowered its aid during 2007 and 2008.  Richard Lapper, Italy 
and France draw fire for aid shortfall, FIN. TIMES (Jun. 11, 2009), http://www.ft.com/ 
intl/cms/s/0/24db0e82-5620-11de-ab7e-00144feabdc0.html.  In January 2011, the U.S. 
House of Representatives passed a budget overhaul that cut $10 billion of funding for the 
State Department and foreign aid, one-sixth of the total savings deducted from President 
Obama’s latest request.  David Rogers, House passes $60 billion in spending cuts, POLITICO 
(Feb. 19, 2011, 5:23 AM), http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=3D71F3B9-DD63-
6416-88C6D047B8123F18. 
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Chinese and Southern perspectives on human rights.28  The second 
part briefly surveys Chinese foreign policy objectives.  The third part 
examines China’s historical presence in Africa, and draws parallels 
and contrasts with various types of Western engagement.  The fourth 
part examines the various ways that China promotes the human rights 
and developmental needs of various African states.  The methodolo-
gy is thus mixed, coupling theoretical and historical approaches in 
the first three parts with empirical observations in the final part.  The 
goal is to challenge the dominant theoretical discourse of Sino-
African relations as developed in the West, based on a sound empiri-
cal footing. 
I. CHINA’S VIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
To grasp the human rights implications of China’s engage-
ment with Africa, we must first understand how China views human 
rights.  Though a dynamic concept that has modulated slightly over 
the past two decades, China’s human rights platform has maintained 
a basic consistency over time.29  Two key concepts include empha-
sizing collective rights over individual ones, and privileging social 
and economic rights over civil and political ones. 
First, China emphasizes collective rights over individual ones.  
This runs counter to core Western assumptions about human rights, 
and the liberal democratic framework of international human rights 
law (IHRL) more generally.30  International human rights law, as 
created after World War II, endows the individual with rights that he 
may then deploy against national governments.  This endowment 
stems from the natural rights idea that humans enjoy certain entitle-
ments simply by virtue of being people.31  In other words, IHRL 
serves to check governmental authority over the individual, ideally 
ensuring a sphere of personal autonomy into which the state may not 
 
 28. The South here refers to less developed countries, or the “nations of Africa, 
Central and Latin American, and most of Asia.”  For a brief explanation, see Center for the 
Global South, AM. UNIV., www1.american.edu/academic.depts/acainst/cgs/about.html (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2013).  It is an oversimplification to group three-quarters of the world’s 
countries under a single heading.  But for present purposes, the South is a placeholder for the 
viewpoints and values of these disparate nations. 
 29. See generally ANN KENT, BETWEEN FREEDOM AND SUBSISTENCE:  CHINA AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS (1993). 
 30. Randall Peerenboom, Assessing Human Rights in China:  Why the Double 
Standard?, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 71, 81 (2005). 
 31. Jack Donnelly, Human Rights as Natural Rights, 4 HUM. RTS. Q. 391, 391 (1982). 
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intrude.32 
But the individual does not lie at the heart of Chinese society, 
either presently or in traditional China.  Like other Asian countries, 
China stresses communitarian values, the importance of groups  
within society and the state’s interests over those of the individual.  
From a rights perspective, China would prefer to buttress the rights of 
the entire community, rather than permit an individual to assert rights 
against the state or community.33  This tendency is surely changing 
as greater individual autonomy bubbles up in contemporary China, 
with important ramifications for asserting human rights.34  But the 
official Chinese view privileges the group at the expense of the indi-
vidual, with important implications for foreign policy and the disbur-
sal of foreign aid.  Whereas Western donors may elect to fund a pro-
ject to promote democracy, entrench human rights, support civil 
society or enhance governance,35 China would prefer to furnish the 
basic subsistence needs of large groups of people.36  Both Western 
and Chinese sets of projects legitimately advance human rights, but 
the divergent goals and methods of attaining those rights leads to 
confusion and recrimination between China and the West. 
Second, as a developing country run by a putatively com-
munist state, the Chinese government and the majority of Chinese 
scholars prioritize social and economic rights over civil and political 
ones.37  What does that mean?  Social and economic rights include 
 
 32. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 268 (6th ed. 2008) (“The view 
adopted by the Western world with regard to international human rights law in general terms 
has tended to emphasise the basic civil and political rights of individuals, that is to say those 
rights that take the form of claims limiting the power of government over the governed.”); 
Guyora Binder, Cultural Relativism & Cultural Imperialism in Human Rights Law, 5 BUFF. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 211, 213 (1999) (international human rights treaties “reflect a liberal 
individualism prevalent in the West, and ignore the importance of group membership, of 
duties, and of respect for nature prevalent in many non-western cultures”). 
 33. See ANN KENT, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS:  THE LIMITS OF 
COMPLIANCE 29–30 (1999) (exploring the traditional Chinese, socialist and Maoist roots of 
China’s emphasis on collective and individual rights). 
 34. See generally Timothy Webster, Ambivalence and Activism:  Employment 
Discrimination in China, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 643 (2011) (arguing that recent 
employment discrimination lawsuits augur an important shift in rights consciousness, and 
the use of litigation as a tool of social change, in contemporary China). 
 35. These are among the many projects supported by the United States Agency for 
International Development. See Democracy, Human Rights and Governance, USAID, 
http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/democracy-human-rights-and-governance (last visited 
Mar. 10, 2013). 
 36. See infra, Part IV. 
 37. ROBERT WEATHERLEY, THE DISCOURSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA:  HISTORICAL 
6. Webster - Final Setting (51-3) (Do Not Delete) 5/17/2013  9:56 AM 
2013] CHINA’S HUMAN RIGHTS FOOTPRINT IN AFRICA 635 
the rights to work, education, employment, social security and basic 
subsistence; food, clothing, water and housing attract significant at-
tention and abundant resources under this rubric.38  Like most com-
munist countries, past and present, China posits the provision of its 
citizenry’s material needs as a central function of government.  For a 
country of 1.3 billion people, that has proven no small feat.39 
Civil and political rights, on the other hand, refer to the rights 
to vote, run for office, assemble, free speech, practice a religion of 
one’s own choosing, receive a fair trial and so on.  In the Chinese 
conception, and in the Marxist tradition more generally, socioeco-
nomic rights are the foundational human rights upon which civil and 
political rights become possible.40  Consequently, in the Chinese 
conception, so long as China is still constructing its socioeconomic 
foundation, discussion of civil and political rights is premature.  
Scholars point out that these two sets of rights are not mutually ex-
clusive; prioritizing one set over another is a Cold War anachronism 
arising out of ideological differences between Western and Soviet 
states.41  That is true as an empirical matter, yet nations—including 
the United States—continue to prioritize one set at the expense of the 
other.42  Yet many countries, including China and several African 
 
& IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 25 (1999); JIN, supra note 6, at 127. 
 38. WEATHERLEY, supra note 37, at 24. 
 39. It is important to recognize that even “Western” financial institutions, such as the 
World Bank, swoon over China’s poverty reduction statistics.  According to the World 
Bank, China lifted some 600 million people out of poverty from 1981 to 2004, accounting 
for some 75% of the poverty reduction in the developing world.  See Results Profile:  China 
Poverty Reduction, THE WORLD BANK (Mar. 19, 2010), http://www.worldbank.org/ 
en/news/2010/03/19/results-profile-china-poverty-reduction. 
 40. As China’s First White Paper on Human Rights put it, in its first sentence, “the 
right to subsistence is the most important of all human rights, without which the other rights 
are out of the question.” I. The Right to Substistence—The Foremost Human Right The 
Chinese People Long Fight for, CHINA.ORG.CN, http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/7/7-I.htm 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2013).  
 41. See MATTHEW C.R. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, 
SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS:  A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 9–11 (1995) 
(describing the Western preferences for civil and political rights and Soviet states’ 
preferences for economic, social and cultural rights). 
 42. One way to appreciate the difference between American and Chinese emphases on 
rights is by comparing the poverty rates of the two countries.  From 1980 to 2005, China 
reduced the number of Chinese people in poverty by 80 to 90%.  I have seen different 
figures to describe this redistribution of wealth, but China lifted somewhere between 200 
and 300 million people out of poverty in a generation.  See, e.g., Anup Shah, Poverty Facts 
and Stats, GLOBAL ISSUES (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.globalissues.org/article/26/poverty-
facts-and-stats (discussing World Bank Development Indicators for China).  In the United 
States, by contrast, the poverty rate has hovered between 12 and 13% during this period, 
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states, stress social and economic over civil and political rights.43 
More broadly, the South has promoted the “right to develop-
ment,” a core of indivisible rights needed to assure the basic necessi-
ties of life.  The 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development 
charges states with ensuring that their people enjoy “access to basic 
resources, education, health services, food, housing, employment and 
the fair distribution of income.” 44  Scholars focus on three rights in 
particular—to food, to primary education and to health—as the bed-
rock upon which all other rights depend.45  Once a person has ac-
quired an education and achieved a level of health, the state can con-
cern itself with providing employment, income, shelter and other 
basic resources. 
Fundamental though the right to development may seem, its 
status as international law is far from assured.  Developed countries 
have long sought to neutralize or deny the existence of the right.  The 
United States voted against passing the Declaration in the UN Gen-
eral Assembly, while many other Western states abstained.46  Never-
theless, the Declaration enjoys wide support among the developing 
world, even as it lacks the broad international backing needed to 
crystallize as a binding legal obligation. 
One key disagreement involves against whom the right may 
be claimed.  The Declaration tasks states with providing for nationals 
within their jurisdiction, as well as “the duty to co-operate with each 
other in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to develop-
 
while the absolute number has increased from twenty-eight to thirty-six million people.  See, 
e.g., National Poverty Center, Poverty in the United States: Frequently Asked Questions, U. 
MICH., http://www.npc.umich.edu/poverty/#3 (last visited Apr. 12, 2013).  In other words, 
the United States has made little progress ensuring the socioeconomic rights of its populace, 
while China has made progress the likes of which the world has never seen.  On the other 
hand, China has done little to safeguard the civil and political rights of its citizens, who do 
not have free and open elections, the right to practice religion freely, the right to assemble 
freely and so on.   
 43. See J. Oloka-Onyango, Beyond the Rhetoric:  Reinvigorating the Struggle for 
Economic and Social Rights in Africa, 26 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 1, 15 (1995) (“[G]overnments 
in both countries have deemphasized the place of civil and political rights and focused on the 
need for ‘development.’”). 
 44. Declaration on the Right to Development, art. 8, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986). 
 45. See JOHN CHARVET & ELISA KACZYNSKA-NAY, THE LIBERAL PROJECT & HUMAN 
RIGHTS:  THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF A NEW WORLD ORDER 145 (2008); Arjun Sengupta, 
Right to Development as a Human Right, 36 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 2527, 2530 (1999), 
available at http://www.harvardfxbcenter.org/resources/working-papers/FXBC_WP7. 
 46. CHARVET & KACZYNSKA-NAY, supra note 45, at 139.  
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ment.” 47  Moreover, states also have the “duty . . . individually and 
collectively, to formulate international development policies with a 
view to facilitating the full realization of the right to development.” 48  
At least as a textual matter, then, a state may have obligations to 
those beyond its immediate borders.  Given most developed coun-
tries’ hostility to this claim, they are unlikely to cooperate, promote a 
new international economy or collectively formulate development 
policies for other states. 
Where are developed countries to turn?  One response would 
be to each other.  It is surely significant that the only international in-
strument enshrining the right to development is the 1981 African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, making the right applicable 
against African states.49  And when those states are incapable of 
providing the core elements of the right to development, presumably 
other inclined states should step in to provide assistance.  China, 
then, can play a critical role in ensuring the right to development is 
guaranteed in the Global South. 
Western states’ disinclination to enshrine the right to devel-
opment is not simply a matter of international law; it also shapes the 
international financial institutions they oversee.  As Anne Orford has 
argued, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund—the 
heart of the Washington Consensus—have long implemented policies 
that actively thwart the right to development.  Since 1986, the World 
Bank has attached conditions to structural adjustment loans to require 
the privatization of basic industries, and the liberalization of trade 
and investment.50  Other structural adjustment loans force govern-
ments to cut spending on health and education, lower the minimum 
wage, produce goods for export (instead of satisfying domestic 
needs) and deregulate the labor market.51  These prescriptions argua-
bly succeeded in certain developed countries, such as the United 
States and United Kingdom, during the heyday of Reaganism and 
Thatcherism. 
But the neoliberal paradigm has not facilitated growth in 
 
 47. Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 44, art. 3(3) (emphasis 
added).  See also African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 22, adopted June 27, 
1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982). 
 48. Id., art. 4(1). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Anne Orford, Globalization and the Right to Development, in PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 
127, 149 (Philip Alston ed., 2001). 
 51. Id. at 151. 
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many countries in Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa.52  
While its record in East Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia is, on 
the whole, more positive, that may be attributable to features of 
Asian societies, rather than neoliberalism itself.53  And of course, the 
2008 financial crisis has punctured many myths about the desirability 
of unregulated economic activity, and leaving the “invisible hand” to 
correct errors and bottlenecks in the market. 
In addition, China’s own rise has led many to reconsider the 
conventional wisdom traditionally ascribed to neoliberal economics 
and deregulation.  The state has played the central role in China’s 
economic rise, overseeing dramatic economic growth without prece-
dent in human history.54  The Chinese example provides an alterna-
tive narrative to how states and societies develop in the contemporary 
period.  Little wonder, then, that African leaders increasingly turn 
their attention towards China in reevaluating the proper balance of 
state intervention and private initiatives. 
II. CHINESE VIEWS OF FOREIGN POLICY 
To understand China’s current engagement with Africa, we 
must also absorb the key features of China’s foreign policy.  For half 
a century, China’s diplomacy has abided by the “Five Principles,” a 
platform first agreed upon by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Indian 
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1954.55  They are: 
1. mutual respect for the other country’s sovereignty; 
2. mutual non-aggression; 
3. mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; 
4. equality and mutual benefit; 
5. peaceful coexistence.56 
In addition, during his 1964 visit to several African countries, 
Premier Zhou Enlai articulated the “Eight Principles for Economic 
Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries”, which include: 
 
 52. DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 154 (2005). 
 53. RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA MODERNIZES:  THREAT TO THE WEST OR MODEL 
FOR THE REST 26–31 (2005). 
 54. C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA’S RISE:  CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 9 
(2008) (China’s economic growth “has averaged 10 percent for the past 30 years, the most 
stunning record in history”). 
 55. Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India, 
Apr. 29, 1954, 299 U.N.T.S. 4307. 
 56. See id. 
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1. equality and mutual benefit in providing aid; 
2. no conditions for any privileges; 
3. imposing the lightest possible burden on recipients; 
4. help the country gradually achieve self-reliance; 
5. aid projects require little investment but quick results; 
6. provide best-quality equipment of its own manufacture; 
7. ensure the recipient country masters new techniques; 
8. Chinese experts cannot enjoy special amenities.57 
Principles two (non-conditionality) and five (quick results af-
ter small investment) are particularly important to the present discus-
sion.  Before examining these principles, however, it is important to 
note their consistency over the past several decades.  Since its found-
ing sixty-plus years ago, China’s domestic situation has undergone 
wild vicissitudes.  From the Great Leap Forward (1959–61), where 
tens of millions starved to death, to the Cultural Revolution (1966–
76), which terrorized generations of Chinese, to the reform period’s 
pursuit of a semi-market economy (1978–present), the PRC has en-
dured some of the most extreme and violent ideological, political, 
economic and cultural swings of the twentieth century.  Nevertheless, 
the basic parameters of its foreign policy have remained intact for 
most of the PRC’s history.58  Its foreign policy has thus hewed to the 
 
 57. See Zhou Enlai Announces Eight Principles of Foreign Aid, CHINA DAILY (Aug. 
13, 2010), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-08/13/content_11149131.htm; State 
Council Information Office, Apr. 21, 2011, White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid, Appendix 
I, http://www.eu-china.net/web/cms/upload/pdf/nachrichten/2011-04-21Chinas-ForeignAid-
WhitePaper.pdf. 
 58. Because of China’s relatively constant foreign policy, African leaders call China, 
with perhaps exaggerated optimism, its “all-weather friend.” See, e.g., Mission of the 
People’s Republic of China to the European Union, Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun Talks 
about Vice President Xi Jinping’s Visit to Four Asian and African Countries (Nov. 24, 
2010), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cebe/eng/zgwj/t772355.htm (noting that leaders of 
Botswana called China an all-weather friend); China, Zambia’s all-weather friend: Zambian 
former PM, PEOPLE’S DAILY (Aug. 30, 2006), http://english.peopledaily. 
com.cn/200608/30/eng20060830_298013.html (noting Zambian former Prime Minister 
Malimba Masheke, after reciting China’s help in building roads, and a mass media complex 
called China Zambia’s all-weather friend); Interview:  COMESA Eyes Agricultural 
Cooperation With China, PEOPLE’S DAILY (Oct. 3, 2000), http://english.peopledaily. 
com.cn/english/200010/03/eng20001003_51778.html (noting former Secretary General of 
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, Erasmus Mwencha, said that China 
has been an “all-weather friend” to Africa from decolonization to the present.  Mwencha 
repeated the comment as Deputy Chairperson of the African Union Commission in 2010); 
Wei Tong, Feimeng Weiyuanhui Fuzhuxi Muwenzha Shengzan Zhongguo Shi Feizhou 
Quantianhou Pengyou [Deputy Chairperson of the African Union Commission Mwencha 
Praises China As Africa’s All Weather Friend], GUOJI ZAIXIAN ZHUANGAO [INTERNATIONAL 
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same principles, more or less, since the 1950s.  During his 1999 visit 
to Africa, then-Vice President Hu Jintao stated “China will, as al-
ways, adhere to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.” 59  Af-
ter becoming president, Hu Jintao has repeatedly referenced individ-
ual principles in speeches presented at Sino-African summits.60 
Compare this with the United States, where each new admin-
istration brings a new set of values, policies, diplomatic techniques 
and personnel to conduct foreign affairs.  In the past decade (2002–
2012) the outside world has seen two very different approaches to 
foreign policy in the United States:  the aggressive unilateralism of 
the George W. Bush administration (2000–2008), followed by the 
measured multilateralism of President Barack Obama (2008–
present).61  Of course, other policy shifts can be seen by reviewing 
past administrations’ approaches to foreign affairs. 
To be sure, espousing principles and enacting them differ, 
sometimes vastly.  China has maintained a rhetorical stance that its 
actions have not always mirrored.  Take mutual non-interference.  
China firmly believes that it should not, and will not, engage in activ-
ities that infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations.  In return, it 
does not permit other countries to interfere in its own internal affairs.  
But throughout the 1960s and 1970s, China supported a wide array of 
guerrilla movements in Africa.  China actively supported guerrillas, 
providing financial and materiel support to rebel groups in Zaire 
(present-day D.R.C.), Malawi, Zimbabwe, Angola, Rwanda and  
Burundi.62  It would be silly to assert that such activities did not “in-
terfere” in the internal affairs of these states.  China tried to justify its 
conduct by claiming to support anticolonial movements, and thus to 
help African countries win their independence from various Europe-
an states.  Still, it is undeniable that, during its early history, the PRC 
actively meddled in the internal affairs of African states. 
More recently, China has scaled back the revolutionary rheto-
ric, but it continues its arms sales.  The concern with inciting com-
munist revolt has been eclipsed by finding new markets to export its 
manufactures obtaining natural resources, and testing new technolo-
 
ONLINE PROFILES] (Feb. 2, 2010), http://gb.cri.cn/27824/2010/02/02/3245s2748783.htm.  
 59. See Chinese Leaders on Sino-African Relations, CHINA.ORG.CN (Dec. 10, 2003), 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/China-Africa/82054.htm. 
 60. FOCAC summit issues declaration, XINHUA (Nov. 16, 2006), http://news.xinhua 
net.com/english/2006-11/06/content_5295615.htm. 
 61. For example, President Bush invaded Iraq without receiving authorization from the 
UN Security Council, whereas President Obama hesitated to invade Libya, preferring instead 
for Britain and France to take the lead. 
 62. See Weinstein, supra note 13, at 147–48. 
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gies.  Pragmatism has prevailed over politics.  Of course, as the west-
ern media and NGOs have amply documented, China continues to 
arm groups engaged in conflicts in Sudan, and to sell weapons to 
Zimbabwe.63  When Africans use guns, ammunition, tanks and jet 
fighters manufactured in China, to wage battles against rebel forces, 
or government armies, China indirectly interferes in other states’ in-
ternal affairs.64  China may not have sold weapons directly to the 
groups using them.65  But that is the quandary of selling weapons to 
places in unstable regions; arms change hands with astonishing fre-
quency. 
While China’s non-interference policy may not withstand 
critical scrutiny, it does have important ramifications for international 
trade and investment.  Among other things, China does not inquire 
into the domestic political situation of the partner country.  If the 
partner provides what China needs—oil, bauxite, copper, timber—
China cares little whether its government is democratic or dictatorial.  
Unlike international financial institutions such as the World Bank, 
China does not condition its aid, investment or trade packages on 
pledges to improve governance, extirpate corruption or end human 
rights abuses.  This policy of realeconomik has led to denunciations 
of Chinese support for some of Africa’s most notorious leaders, in-
cluding Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan and 
a handful of minor players—such as Moussa Didis Camara (former 
dictator of Guinea) and Jose Eduardo dos Santos (president of Ango-
la since 1979).66 
 
 63. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 3 (cataloguing China’s arms sales to 
Sudan). 
 64. See, e.g., Celia W. Dugger, Zimbabwe Arms Shipped by China Spark an Uproar, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/19/world/africa/19zimba 
bwe.html (Even in the context of an arms sale to Robert Mugabe, one of Africa’s most brutal 
dictators, the Chinese foreign minister stated, “[o]ne of the most important principles is not 
to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries”). 
 65. The discovery of Chinese arms in areas such as the DRC, Somalia and Sudan does 
not prove that China sold arms in violation of UN sanctions levied against these states.  But 
China has refused to cooperate with UN arms experts, perhaps shielding its own domestic 
arms industry.  See Colum Lynch, China’s Arms Exports Flooding Sub-Saharan Africa, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-08-25/world/3549165 
9_1_arms-exports-chinese-diplomats-chinese-weapons. 
 66. The BBC cited President Dos Santos, who has ruled Angola since 1979, in its list 
of richest corrupt rulers.  While his net worth is unknown, President Dos Santos ranked 
alongside Teodoro Obiang of Equatorial Guinea (a close United States ally), and Nursultan 
Nazarbeyev of Kazakhstan (another close United States ally) as the top three current leaders 
most enriched by graft.  See Suharto tops corruption rankings, BBC NEWS (Mar. 25, 2004), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3567745.stm. 
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I will return to these countries later in the discussion,67 but 
here simply note that China’s support for unsavory African leaders 
cannot be divorced from its broader network of relationships in Afri-
ca.  Every African state that recognizes and maintains diplomatic re-
lations with China (and not Taiwan) receives some kind of aid.68  
Thus, unlike France and Britain, which channel the vast majority of 
their aid and assistance programs almost exclusively on former colo-
nies, China works with everybody.69  And while many criticize Chi-
na’s collaboration with “the worst of the worst,” the United States 
also provides assistance to such countries as Angola, Sudan and 
Zimbabwe, in addition to forty-six other African states.70 
III. CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT IN AFRICA 
China’s engagement with Africa dates back to 1417, when 
Chinese admiral Zheng He visited various African ports in the early 
Ming Dynasty.  Between 1405 and 1433, Zheng He led a total of 
seven voyages, some including as many as 312 ships to Southeast 
Asia, South Asia and eventually East Africa.71  On the fifth voyage 
(1417–1419), the fleet landed in Mogadishu, Mombassa, Zanzibar, 
Madagascar and probably Egypt.  Zheng He brought back interesting 
souvenirs from his trip, including a giraffe, as a token of his travels. 
But with Zheng’s death in Calcutta on the seventh voyage, the 
era of Chinese maritime expedition ground suddenly to a halt.  Spec-
ulation abounds as to why China—having set forth the largest over-
seas expedition in human history—abandoned this endeavor.  Per-
haps China had met its goals of extending its influence to distant 
lands, proving its military capabilities, expanding Chinese knowledge 
 
 67. See infra, Part III.  
 68. DEBORAH BRAUTIGAM, THE DRAGON’S GIFT: THE REAL STORY OF CHINA IN AFRICA 
278 (2009).  As of December 2012, five African states recognize the Republic of China on 
Taiwan:  Burkina Faso, Lesotho, Gambia, Swaziland, Sao Tome and Principe. 
 69. The United Kingdom devotes 89% of its African aid to sixteen countries, twelve of 
which are former colonies.  See Alan Hudson, UK Aid to Africa: A Report for the UFJ 
Institute, OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE (Jan. 20, 2006), 16–18, http://www.odi.org.uk/ 
resources/docs/3693.pdf.  In addition, Britain provides smaller amounts of aid to former 
colonies such as Somalia, Eritrea, Namibia and Gambia.   
 70. USAID, Bureau for Africa, http://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/organization/ 
bureaus/bureau-africa (last updated June 7, 2012).  
 71. Barbara Bennett Peterson, The Ming Voyages of Cheng Ho (Zheng He), 1371–
1433, 16 GREAT CIRCLE 43, 44 (1994). 
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of the world and incorporating more states into its tribute system.72  
Or perhaps threats closer to home occupied the Ming Dynasty’s at-
tention.73  Whatever the explanation, China turned its back on Africa 
for the succeeding five centuries. 
China’s neglect contrasts sharply with the more active in-
volvement of early Europeans.  The Portuguese conquered their first 
African city in 1415 (Ceuta), captured their first slaves in 1441 (Cabo 
Branco, Mauritani) and established Europe’s first slave-trading com-
pany in 1444 (Lagos, Nigeria).74  The consequences of European ex-
ploitation, enslavement and extraction are well known at this point, 
and do not require additional explication.  Yet these historical origins 
matter for contemporary relations between China and Africa on the 
one hand, and the West and Africa on the other. 
After the founding of the PRC in 1949, China maintained 
more regular contact with Africa.  Between 1956 and 1977—amidst 
the internal chaos of the Great Leap Forward (1957) and Cultural 
Revolution (1966–76)—the PRC provided an estimated $2.668 bil-
lion in economic assistance to African countries, approximately fifty-
seven percent of its total foreign aid.75  China supported not only its 
ideological brethren experimenting with socialism, but states of all 
political stripes:  monarchies, dictatorships and democracies.  China 
provided aid to thirty-six African nations during this period, a broad 
swath of the continent. 
At this time, the largest recipients of Chinese aid were Tanza-
nia and Zambia, most of which was spent constructing a 2000-km 
railway discussed below.  Other large recipients included Egypt, the 
first African state to recognize the PRC, Somalia and Zaire, all of 
which received over $100 million during these two decades.76  While 
not large by global standards, these sums are nonetheless impressive 
in light of the fact that China was itself a developing country, unable 
to feed its own population for several of these years.77  China laid the 
 
 72. Id. at 46. 
 73. Id. at 44. 
 74. Claudia Rei, The Organization of Eastern Merchant Empires, 48 EXPLORATIONS IN 
ECON. HIST. 116, 119, 123 (2011). 
 75. These figures come from a 1978 CIA Report, recently unclassified.  See United 
States Central Intelligence Agency National Foreign Assessment Center, Communist Aid 
Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries 1978: A Research Paper, at 7, 
available at http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_ 
0000499889.pdf [hereinafter CIA Report]. 
 76. Id. at 8, 10.  
 77. FRANK DIKOTTER, MAO’S GREAT FAMINE: THE HISTORY OF CHINA’S MOST 
DEVASTATING CATASTROPHE: 1958–1962 (2010) (estimating that 45 million Chinese died 
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foundations for many of its current relationships in the 1960s, provid-
ing small amounts of military and financial aid to newly independent 
states and guerrilla movements. 
Chinese aid frequently took the form of small loans, spread 
out over a period of up to ten years, to dozens of African countries.78  
China gave more foreign aid to Africa than Eastern European coun-
tries; indeed China outspent even the Soviet Union in many sub-
Saharan states,79 maximizing its influence by providing aid to a large 
number of newly independent states, whatever their political ideolo-
gy.  A handful of former colonies shared China’s revolutionary fer-
vor, and this revolutionary suffused a number of political pro-
nouncements from this early period.80  But China was no ideological 
purist, providing aid to countries of vastly disparate political inclina-
tions.  During its first decades, the PRC spent the bulk of its foreign 
aid in Africa, more or less ceding Latin America, the Middle East and 
South Asia to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.81 
In the immediate post-revolutionary period, China’s primary 
political purpose in Africa was securing diplomatic recognition.  A 
young country born into the world with an ideologically opposed 
twin brother on the island of Taiwan, China needed allies in a world 
eager to contain it.  The United States firmly opposed Chinese in-
volvement in various international organizations, including the Unit-
ed Nations.82  The isolation was exacerbated by the Sino-Soviet riff 
in the early 1960s, leaving China more vulnerable to international 
pressure.  Since it was not a member of the United Nations until 
1971, and not recognized by most countries during the 1950s and 
1960s, China courted African countries to secure recognition of its 
international status.  In April 1955, Premier Zhou Enlai and Vice 
Premier Chen Yi attended the Summit on Afro-Asian Solidarity in 
Bandung, Indonesia, holding talks with leaders from various North 
and Sub-Saharan African States:  Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Liberia and 
Ethiopia.83  One year later, Egypt became the first country to enter 
 
during the Great Leap Forward). 
 78. CIA Report, supra note 75, Table 5.  
 79. Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Yugoslavia topped the list of Eastern European 
donors.  Id. 
 80. BRUCE D. LARKIN, CHINA & AFRICA 1949–1970:  THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 175 (1971). 
 81. Id.  
 82. ANN KENT, BEYOND COMPLIANCE: CHINA, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND 
GLOBAL SECURITY 33 (2007). 
 83. LIU HONGWU & LUO JIANBO, ZHONGFEI FA ZHAN HE ZUO:  LI LUN, ZHAN LUE YU 
ZHENG CE YAN JIU [SINO-AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION:   STUDIES ON THE THEORIES, 
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into diplomatic relations with the newly founded People’s Repub-
lic,84 followed by Sudan (1958), Morocco (1958) and Guinea 
(1959).85  By 1965, China had secured diplomatic recognition from 
eighteen African states.  This number dipped to thirteen by 1970, as 
Taiwan launched a diplomatic counter-offensive.86  But by 1979, on 
the eve of China’s reform, some forty-four African states recognized 
China.87 
Zhou Enlai again visited Africa in 1964–65,88 committing 
$190 million in aid to seven African countries, including Algeria, 
Egypt, Sudan and Tanzania.89  To be sure, this is not a lot of aid by 
comparison with Western powers.  But as a developing country itself, 
China was hardly positioned to offer more generous terms.  Instead, 
China made its aid count by providing acutely needed developmental 
assistance in what I call the “five pillars” of China’s development 
diplomacy:  agricultural support (state farms, rice cultivation, chicken 
breeding); light industry (factories, mills, industrial plants); power 
plants (hydroelectric, coal); infrastructure (roads, highways, rail-
ways); medical support (doctors, nurses and medicines); and tech-
nical assistance (training, education).90  These five pillars have been 
a relatively stable strain of Sino-African relations for half a century. 
From technical and public relations perspectives, the greatest 
achievement of China’s Africa policy was the Tanzam Railway, 
stretching 1,156 miles from landlocked Zambia to coastal Tanzania.  
At a cost of just under half a billion dollars, China supplied much of 
the labor, and an interest-free loan payable over thirty years, to the 
governments of Tanzania and Zambia.  At the time, the World Bank, 
the United States and the United Kingdom had denied requests to 
fund the project.91  So, too, did the United Nations, the U.S.S.R. and 
Canada.92  Tanzania, born in 1964 from the conjunction of a former 
 
STRATEGIES AND POLICIES] 175 (2011). 
 84. Id. 
 85. George T. Yu, Peking’s African Diplomacy, in CHINA: NEW FORCE IN WORLD 
AFFAIRS 148, 150–51 (Irwin Isenberg ed., 1972). 
 86. Id. at 150. 
 87. LIU & LUO, supra note 83, at 175. 
 88. Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Sudan, Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Somalia, Zaire, Tanzania 
and Uganda. 
 89. Yu, supra note 85, at 150. 
 90. Id. at 154–58. 
 91. RICHARD HALL & HUGH PEYMAN, THE GREAT UHURU RAILWAY: CHINA’S 
SHOWPIECE IN AFRICA 90 (1976). 
 92. George T. Yu, The Tanzania-Zambia Railway:  A Case Study in Chinese Economic 
Aid to Africa, in SOVIET AND CHINESE AID TO AFRICAN NATIONS 117, 122–23 (Warren 
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British colony and an Arab island, had few allies among the more 
powerful states.  China stepped in to fill the void, generating good-
will among two newly liberated African states, while also gaining ac-
cess to Zambia’s rich copper belt.  This is part of the “mutual bene-
fit” or win-win results that China has long touted as central to its 
foreign policy. 
Despite the impressive scale of the Tanzam railway, most of 
China’s aid to Africa was spent on less grandiose projects.93  China 
spent the remaining two-plus billion dollars on smaller projects with 
more localized influence.  According to the CIA, China “had become 
the African countries’ favorite donor in the early 1970s,” by funding 
a wide assortment of infrastructure projects.94  Projects included, but 
were not limited to, (1) building a nuclear power plant and deep-
water port in the Mauritanian capital of Nouakchott, and supporting 
medical and agricultural projects in the country;95 (2) constructing a 
hydroelectric dam in Congo, and building related electrical capaci-
ty;96 (3) resurfacing a road in Madagascar;97 (4) building a hospital, 
sports stadium, flour mill and ceramics plant in Rwanda.98  In July, 
1966, two months into the chaos of the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution, China laid the foundation stone of the Friendship Textile 
Mill in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, the largest fully-integrated textile 
mill in East Africa at the time.99  The mill presently operates through 
a Sino-Tanzanian joint venture company, employing over one thou-
sand Tanzanians.100 
Further afield—and China has made a point of sending ex-
perts, aid and equipment into the more remote regions of Africa—
China built dams, factories, a pharmaceutical plant in Tanzania and 
other basic infrastructure to help provide basic subsistence for one of 
 
Weinstein & Thomas H. Henriksen eds., 1980). 
 93. See CIA Report, supra note 75, at 19–27 (describing aid projects, funded by 
various communist countries, in individual African countries). 
 94. Id. at 21. 
 95. Id. at 20. 
 96. Id. at 25. 
 97. Id. at 26. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Gail A. Eadie & Denise M. Grizzell, China’s Foreign Aid, 1975–1978, 77 CHINA 
Q. 217, 219–20 (1979). 
 100. See Ching Kwan Lee, Raw Encounters:  Chinese Managers, African Workers and 
the Politics of Casualization in Africa’s Chinese Enclaves, 199 CHINA Q. 647, 652 (2009) 
(noting the number of casual workers, at 869, had exceeded the number of full-time workers, 
at 818). 
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Africa’s least developed countries.101  By 1970, China had provided 
Tanzania with $250 million in aid, and by 1971, China did surpass 
Britain in one respect, becoming Tanzania’s largest source of foreign 
aid.102  China made similar inroads throughout Guinea, building a 
hydroelectric plant in Pita, a dam in Tinkisso, a refinery in Madio-
noula, in addition to railway construction and repair.103  China also 
assisted in agricultural development of an unspecified nature. 
While this section has emphasized various types of subsist-
ence projects, it is also important to recognize the breadth of Chinese 
military support.  For certain states, this support amounted to direct 
meddling in internal affairs, again presenting a challenge to China’s 
long-held self-conception as a state that does not interfere in other 
nations’ business.  Apart from the generation of goodwill, the Tan-
zam railroad and larger emphasis on critical infrastructure to politi-
cally isolated states presaged key aspects of China’s Africa policy:  
providing basic necessities on relatively generous financial terms to 
countries when no other institution or government will offer assis-
tance.  This preference has continued relevance in the present day.  
Many contemporary commentators censure China’s support for rogue 
states,104 overlooking the fact that China occupied a similarly de-
graded position for decades. 
Since the late 1990s, China has redoubled its activities in Af-
rica across a wide spectrum of sectors.  Many efforts have been re-
ported in the Western media:  arming the Sudanese military,105 veto-
ing UN Security Resolutions against Zimbabwean President Robert 
Mugabe,106 shooting miners in Zambia,107 or supporting kleptocra-
 
 101. LARKIN, supra note 80, at 97–98. 
 102. Yu, supra note 85, at 154. 
 103. LARKIN, supra note 80, at 98.  
 104. See supra notes 1–11 and accompanying text. 
 105. See China defends arms sales to Sudan, BBC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7258059.stm (describing remarks by China’s special 
envoy on Darfur that China accounts for 8% of Sudan’s arm imports, and that the United 
States, United Kingdom and Russia also export arms to Sudan). 
 106. See Maggie Farley, Russia, China veto move to sanction Zimbabwe regime, L.A. 
TIMES (July 12, 2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jul/12/world/fg-zimbabwe12. 
 107. See Barry Bearak, Zambia Uneasily Balances Chinese Investment and Workers’ 
Resentment, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/21/world/africa/ 
21zambia.html?pagewanted=all (noting that two Chinese mine managers wounded thirteen 
Zambian miners after hundreds of angry coal miners rushed a locked gate); Barry Bearak, 
Zambia Drops Case of Shooting by Chinese Mine Bosses, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/05/world/africa/05zambia.html (noting that Zambian 
prosecutors had dropped the case against the two Chinese supervisors).  Of course, this 
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cies in Angola.108  But China’s presence in Africa extends far beyond 
the conflict-ridden regions of Zimbabwe and Sudan, and the re-
source-rich areas of Zambia and Angola. 
In 2000, China initiated the Forum on China-Africa Coopera-
tion (FOCAC), a multifaceted intergovernmental mechanism to pro-
mote development and strengthen ties between China and those Afri-
can states that recognize the PRC.  Since that time, triennial 
ministerial meetings in Beijing and various African capitals (Addis 
Ababa, Cairo), coupled with annual and biannual meetings between 
lower level officials, has enhanced Sino-African trade, investment 
and mutual comprehension.109  Bilateral trade between China and Af-
rica has grown eighty-fold in over a decade, from two billion dollars 
in 1999, to $160 billion in 2012.110  Chinese foreign direct invest-
ment into Africa, though notoriously difficult to track, also appears to 
have skyrocketed.  Between 1996 and 2007, the amount of FDI also 
increased eighty-fold, from fifty-six million dollars to $4.46 bil-
lion.111  While these are not vast sums—either in terms of China’s to-
tal outward investment, or Africa’s inward investment—they do sug-
gest the large increases in economic activity between China and 
Africa in the recent past. 
Sino-African relations have evolved over the past six decades. 
Early ties between the continent and China grew out of China’s 
linked desires to win diplomatic recognition from members of the in-
ternational community, and to support nascent anti-colonial move-
ments.  Small independent states, while not significant political ac-
tors on the global stage, cast votes at the UN General Assembly, and 
 
echoes a 2005 incident, when an explosion at the Chinese-owned and -operated Chambishi 
mine killed forty-eight Zambian miners. 
 108. See generally Elias Isaac, The West’s Retreat and China’s Advance in Angola, in 
CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA 163, 165–66 (Axel Harneit-
Sievers et al. eds., 2010) (“For the majority of Angolan citizens the Chinese presence is very 
problematic.  It is seen as neocolonialism in which the ruling political elite sold the country 
to Chinese capital without any consideration of the need to protect national interests.  But the 
ruling political elite sees it differently.  They see it as an opportunity to obtain hard cash for 
the reconstruction of the devastated infrastructure for which payments are made with raw 
materials such as oil and fish.”). 
 109. See FOCAC ABC (May 21, 2012), www.focac.org/eng/ltda/ltjj/t933522.htm. 
 110. Center for Chinese Studies, University of Stellenbosch, Policy Briefing, FOCAC: 
Trade, investment and aid in China-Africa relations, at 1 (May 2012), available at 
http://www.ccs.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/FOCAC_Policy-Briefing_tradeinvest_ 
final.pdf.  
 111. Mary-Francoise Renard, China’s Trade and FDI in Africa, 18, (African 
Development Bank Group, Working Paper No. 126, May 2011), available at 
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Working%20126.pdf. 
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China was able to wrest the UN seat from Taiwan in 1971 in no small 
part due to close connections with dozens of African countries.  Chi-
na’s relationships with African states of various stripes hark back to 
this era.  And of course China itself struggled to win international 
recognition among the international community.  Its current support 
for “rogue” states—a term understood best from the eye of the be-
holder—stems from connections first cultivated decades ago. 
IV. SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS IN AFRICA 
The remainder of this Article examines the human rights im-
plications of China’s presence in Africa.  Given the above articula-
tion of China’s human rights concerns, the focus will be on programs 
to entrench socioeconomic rights of African people.  In the past sev-
eral decades, China has implemented hundreds of projects in nearly 
every African country:  building hydropower plants and railroads, 
training medical personnel and students, paving roads, building ports 
and so on.  In so doing, China has helped raise the living standards, 
and entrench the socioeconomic rights, of millions of Africans. 
Before turning to these forms of assistance, it is important to 
note that China would probably not use the language of entrenching 
human rights to describe its presence in Africa.  In surveying Chinese 
scholarship on Sino-African relations, the issue of human rights rare-
ly comes up.  When it does, it often responds to abuses chronicled by 
Western journalists, scholars and academics.112  This is in part be-
cause “human rights” is still a sensitive term in Chinese diplomacy, 
given the decades of accusations leveled against China for its own 
human rights abuses.  Prolonged censure has led China to tread care-
fully on this issue, particularly in the international arena.  Generally 
speaking, China hesitates to call attention to other countries’ human 
rights abuses, unless of course that country has already criticized 
China’s own record.113 
 
 112. See, e.g., JIN CANRONG, BIG POWER’S RESPONSIBILITY:  CHINA’S PERSPECTIVE 115–
121 (RENMIN UNIVERSITY PRESS 2010).  Professor Jin notes various criticisms from the 
West, but counters them by noting China’s foreign aid, economic cooperation, trade, 
capacity-building endeavors, infrastructure projects and so on.  Notably, he avoids the term 
“human rights” in this analysis. 
 113. China is largely reluctant to criticize other countries’ domestic situations.  But 
China has responded to the United States Department of State’s annual summary of other 
countries’ human rights records by publishing the “U.S. Human Rights Record” every year 
since 2000.  See, e.g., State Council Information Office, U.S. Human Rights Record in 1999, 
http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/ppflg/t36620.htm.  
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During its own three decades of reform and opening up, Chi-
na—like many other East Asian countries before it—has prioritized 
economic development over other forms of human development.  
More concretely, China has privileged feeding, housing, clothing, 
educating and providing for the basic subsistence of its citizenry, 
over environmental concerns, workplace safety, food safety and so 
on.  On the one hand, this has led to one of the greatest economic 
success stories in world history, and the epochal lifting of hundreds 
of millions of people out of poverty.114  On the other, China has also 
achieved more dubious accolades, such as surpassing the United 
States as the world’s leading producer of carbon dioxide,115 leading 
the world in deaths attributable to mining accidents116 and executing 
more prisoners “than the rest of the world combined.” 117 
China’s conduct in Africa reflects the prioritization of socio-
economic rights over other types of human development.  By target-
ing trade, investment, infrastructure, education and agriculture, China 
is trying to replicate in Africa various aspects of its own domestic 
economic transformation.  At the same time, the lax environmental 
and labor standards by which Chinese companies operate in Africa 
unfortunately replicate the lax environmental and labor standards 
practiced at home.  In other words, the African implementation of the 
China model may raise living standards for some, while simultane-
ously depressing the quality of life for others. 
China’s conduct in Africa differs from the West in other ways 
as well.  Unlike Western aid projects—whether from G-8 countries 
or international financial institutions (IFI)—China does not attach 
strings, or “conditionalities,” to its development packages, whether 
in the form of improved governance indicators, better economic 
management, a particular ideology, improved human rights record or 
otherwise.  The refusal to incorporate conditions, frequently criti-
cized in the West, is not exactly a new paradigm for China. Julius 
Nyerere, Tanzania’s first democratically elected president, described 
China’s financial support for the Tanzanian-Zambian railroad in 1974 
in the following way:  “The Chinese people have not asked us to be-
 
 114. See supra note 39. 
 115. Richard Black, China ‘Won’t Follow US’ on Carbon Emissions, BBC NEWS (Oct. 
25, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-15444858 (noting China’s 
emissions surpassed the United States, but per capita emissions are still lower). 
 116. Mark Gregory, Why Are China’s Mines So Dangerous?, BBC NEWS (Oct. 7, 2010), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-11497070 (noting that China accounts for 80% of the 
world’s mining deaths). 
 117. Mark McDonald, China Said to Execute Thousands in ’09, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/31/world/asia/31execute.html?_r=0. 
6. Webster - Final Setting (51-3) (Do Not Delete) 5/17/2013  9:56 AM 
2013] CHINA’S HUMAN RIGHTS FOOTPRINT IN AFRICA 651 
come communists in order to qualify for this loan . . . .  They have 
never at any point suggested that we should change any of our poli-
cies—internal or external.” 118  Indeed, Nyerere would later single out 
conditionality as one of the primary evils inflicted by IFIs on devel-
oping countries.119 
Decades later, China’s ideological agnosticism appeals to 
many African states, not just those countries that have fallen afoul of 
Western standards of good governance and human rights, but also 
those that simply do not want to be preached to.  The last point suf-
fuses Chinese scholarship on this issue, namely that China’s relation-
ship with Africa is “win-win,” that China is Africa’s “all-weather 
friend” and that its assistance represents South-South cooperation.  
China ostensibly sidesteps the paternalism of Western financial insti-
tutions and donor countries by approaching Africa as a classmate 
(one hesitates to use the word “equal” given China’s enormous eco-
nomic clout vis-à-vis individual African countries), instead of a 
taskmaster.  While IFIs have dictated the rules of engagement, often 
without significant input from African stakeholders, China has not 
unilaterally promulgated one formula to cure Africa’s myriad devel-
opmental ailments. 
China’s economic engagement with Africa is a complex topic 
on which entire books have been written.120  Four points are especial-
ly salient to the discussion of human rights:  the emphasis on infra-
structure, medical services, education, and food and water.  Western 
aid programs have either overlooked these areas,121 or retreated in the 
 
 118. Paul Opoku-Mensah, China and the International Aid System:  Transformation or 
Cooptation?, in THE RISE OF CHINA AND THE CAPITALIST WORLD ORDER 71, 82 (Li Xing ed., 
2010). 
 119. See Julius Nyerere, An Address, 17 DEV. AND CHANGE 387, 393 (1986). 
 120. Probably the most balanced accounts in English are DEBORAH BRAUTIGAN, THE 
DRAGON’S GIFT:  THE REAL STORY OF CHINA IN AFRICA (2009) and the collected volume 
CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA (Axel Harneit-Sievers et al. eds., 
2010).  Somewhat less balanced are IAN TAYLOR, CHINA’S NEW ROLE IN AFRICA (2009) and 
PHILIPPE RICHER, L’OFFENSIVE CHINOISE EN AFRIQUE [THE CHINESE OFFENSIVE IN AFRICA] 
(2008).  Only a handful of Chinese books have addressed Sino-African relations.  The best I 
have come across is LIU HONGWU & LUO JIANBO, ZHONG FEI FA ZHAN HE ZUO:  LI LUN, ZHAN 
LUE YU ZHENG CE YAN JIU [SINO-AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION:  STUDIES ON THE 
THEORIES, STRATEGIES AND POLICIES] (2011).  A number of students at such Chinese 
universities as Yunnan University and Zhejiang Normal University have written Master’s 
theses on the topic in the years 2008 to 2011, suggesting that more Chinese scholarship is 
probably forthcoming. 
 121. For example, the World Bank insisted throughout the 1980s and 1990s that African 
users pay for health and education services, despite the obvious fact that many Africans 
could not afford them.  This led to a decline in access to health services in many countries, 
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recent past.122  Yet each facet is essential to the continued develop-
ment of Africa, and the realization of basic socio-economic human 
rights. 
A. Infrastructure 
There is no human right to infrastructure per se.  But interna-
tional human rights law guarantees a number of rights that hinge di-
rectly on functional infrastructure and the benefits that flow from the 
ability to move goods, people and resources around a country.  Some 
60 years ago, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognized 
“the right to a standard of living adequate for . . . health and well-
being . . . including food, clothing, housing and medical care and 
necessary social services.” 123  The International Covenant of Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (which China has ratified) recog-
nizes “the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living,” to in-
clude food, clothing, housing and “the continuous improvement of 
living conditions.” 124  Likewise, the 1986 Declaration of the Right to 
Development stresses the “constant improvement of the well-being 
of the entire population” and the “fair distribution of the benefits re-
sulting therefrom,” to be achieved through international coopera-
tion.125  To be sure, no covenant mentions power plants, highways, 
railways and the like.  Yet it would be difficult to deliver medical and 
social services, or to attain the fair distribution of benefits, without a 
fairly large network of roads, trains and airports. 
China has helped build and repair roads, trains, ports, fiber-
optic cables and other channels to aid the flow of information, goods 
and people all across Africa.  China has invested in the building of 
schools, hospitals, offices, health-care centers, malaria prevention 
centers and other facilities to improve the health and developmental 
capacity of Africans.  In 2007, China provided over 3 billion dollars 
to construct ten hydropower plants in Nigeria, Sudan and other plac-
es.126  In 2007, China also launched a satellite for the Nigerian gov-
 
with concomitant ill effects on health (e.g., rises in infant mortality rates), and significant 
erosions in government spending on education.  See JONATHAN GLENNIE, THE TROUBLE WITH 
AID:  WHY LESS COULD MEAN MORE FOR AFRICA 42–44 (2008). 
 122. See Results Profile:  China Poverty Reduction, supra note 39. 
 123. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25(1), G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
 124. International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, art. 11(1), Dec. 
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].  
 125. Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 44, art. 2(3). 
 126. Vivien Foster et al., The World Bank, Building Bridges:  China’s Growing Role as 
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ernment, which will boost broadcasting, phone and internet capabili-
ties throughout the continent.127 
A significant portion of China’s assistance aims to provide 
basic infrastructure and other public goods:  roads, railways, power 
plants and so on.  Such assistance materially improves the lives of 
ordinary Africans by accelerating the delivery of food, clothing, med-
icines and other necessary products to remote corners of the conti-
nent.  At the same time, it eases the flow of goods and natural re-
sources produced in Africa to markets in the continent and around the 
world.  By one estimate, China has engaged in 519 projects in Africa, 
laying down some 3,000 kilometers of road and 2,000 kilometers of 
railroads.128 
The construction of roads may seem distant from the human 
rights agenda, but it can in fact be considered a pressing human rights 
concern.  Basic infrastructure is critical to human development, and 
Africa sorely lacks such roads.129  South Sudan, Africa’s newest 
country occupying a territory roughly equivalent to that of France, 
contains fewer than 100 kilometers of roads.130  Many African coun-
tries face similar deprivation.  In an amusing, if dispiriting, report by 
The Economist, a 370-mile journey from Douala, Cameroon to the 
interior city of Bertoua took the correspondent four days, instead of 
 
Infrastructure Financier for Sub-Saharan Africa, Executive Summary, 3–4 (2008), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/BB_Final_Exec_summary_Engli
sh_July08_Wo-Embg.pdf. 
 127. See China launches Nigerian satellite, BBC NEWS (May 14, 2007, 8:31 AM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6653067.stm. 
 128. Liu He & Qiu Jun, Zhongguo Qieshi Bangzhu Feizhou Yingdui Weiji, Jiang Jixu 
Tuidong Feizhou Fazhan [China Effectively Helps Africa Weather the Crisis: Will Continue 
to Promote African Development], XINHUA (Mar. 1, 2009), http://news.xinhuanet.com/ 
fortune/2009-03/02/content_10926691.htm.  The precise length of roads and railroads that 
China has helped build in Africa is difficult to measure.  During the 2009 FOCAC meeting, 
Premier Wen Jiabao said China had helped Africa build 2,200 kilometers of roads and 3,300 
kilometers of railways.  China Comes to Help Africa with Aid and Whole Heart: Chinese 
Premier, XINHUA (Nov. 9, 2009), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-11/09/content_12 
413099.htm. 
 129. See Michael Fleshman, Laying Africa’s Roads to Prosperity:  The Continent 
Targets Its Infrastructure Gap, 22 AFRICAN RENEWAL 12, 16 (2009) (“Africa has only about 
25 per cent of the paved road per kilometre found in other low-income regions and an eighth 
of the electricity-generation capacity per person.”); Piet Buys et al., Development Research 
Group, World Bank, Road Network Upgrading and Overland Trade Expansion in Sub-
Saharan Africa, 44–47 (2006) (noting that poor transport infrastructure, including a lack of 
functional roads, has contributed to poverty in many Sub-Saharan African countries). 
 130. South Sudan’s Future:  Now for the Hard Part, ECONOMIST (Feb. 3, 2011), 
http://www.economist.com/node/18070450. 
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the twenty hours originally planned.131 
In light of the infrastructural challenges facing Africa, Chi-
nese investment plays an increasingly vital role.132  One notable 
state-owned enterprise is the China Road and Bridge Corporation 
(CRBC), which has been active in twenty African countries since the 
1960s.133  While aggregate statistics are not available, individual 
sources reveal the scope of CRBC’s footprint in Africa.  In Kenya, 
CRBC has constructed over 1,000 kilometers of roads since 1985.134  
Its most famous project in East Africa is a section of road that links 
Nairobi, Kenya’s political and economic capital, to Mombasa, its 
main port.  Known locally as the “China Road,” it receives plaudits 
from Kenyan drivers as the “best road in Kenya and even in East Af-
rica.” 135  The CRBC has also built the Addis Ababa Ring Road in 
Ethiopia.  Other Chinese companies include the China Railway Sev-
enth Group, active in half a dozen African nations, including its least 
developed.136  It has built, or plans to build, substantial roads in Tan-
zania, Ethiopia, Zambia and Botswana.137 
 
 131. Trucking in Cameroon:  The Road to Hell Is Unpaved, ECONOMIST (Dec. 19, 
2002), http://www.economist.com/node/ 1487583. 
 132. China has signed bilateral investment treaties with twenty-six African countries.  
While some accuse China of structuring its BIT program to favor outbound investment at the 
expense of inbound investment, this is not uncommon among developing countries or other 
capital-exporting states.  See Leon Trakman, University of New South Wales Centre for 
Law, Markets & Regulations, Enter the Dragon IV:  China’s Proliferating Investment Treaty 
Program, http://www.clmr.unsw.edu.au/article/deterrence/public-v-private-enforcement/ent 
er-dragon-iv-chinas-proliferating-investment-treaty-program. 
 133. See China Road and Bridge Corporation, CHINA RADIO INT’L (Oct. 14, 2010, 
9:00:23 PM), http://english.cri.cn/7146/2010/10/14/2041s599399.htm.  
 134. Michael Chege, Economic Relations between Kenya and China, 1963–2007, in 
U.S. AND CHINESE ENGAGEMENT IN AFRICA:  PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVING U.S.-CHINA-AFRICA 
COOPERATION 12, 26 (J. Stephen Morrison ed., 2008), available at http://csis.org/files/media/ 
csis/pubs/080711_cooke_us_chineseengagement_web.pdf. 
 135. Id.  
 136. Ishmael Kindama Dumbuya, President Koroma Hands Over $30m Road Project to 
China Railway Seventh Group, STANDARD TIMES PRESS, http://standardtimespress.org/? 
p=1330 (last visited Apr. 25, 2013).  The article lists road projects in Sierra Leone, Mali and 
Guinea, which are among the world’s least developed states.  For country-specific statistics 
on human development, see the United Nations Development Program’s International 
Human Development Indicators, available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics (ranking 
Guinea as 178th, Mali as 182nd and Sierra Leone as 177th out of 187 states). 
 137. Yang Xuesong, Zhongguo Canyu Feizhou Gonglu Jianshede Xianzhuang yu 
Qianjing [The Current Status and Prospect of China’s Participation in African Road 
Construction], 6 GUOJI SHICHANG [INT’L MARKET] 66, 67 (2010).  Yang mentions China 
Railway’s plan to build a 118-km road in Ethiopia, two long roads in Tanzania (sixty 
kilometers and eighty-five kilometers respectively), a forty-eight kilometer road in 
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B. Medicine 
International law makes access to health care a fundamental 
human right.  The ICESCR recognizes the “right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health,” 138 and more specifically, ensures the “creation of conditions 
which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in 
the event of sickness.” 139  Many African countries struggle to pro-
vide needed medical services to their citizens, and hence secure this 
human right.  To use the language of the Declaration of the Right to 
Development, by providing decades of medical assistance to various 
African countries, China is fulfilling its “duty to co-operate with 
each other in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to de-
velopment.” 140 
China has provided medical assistance in various forms to Af-
rica for half a century.  In 1963, China dispatched its first team of 
medical doctors abroad to work in the recently liberated former 
French colony of Algeria.141  Since that time, Algeria has benefited 
tremendously from China’s overseas assistance.  In December 1978, 
the Chinese government sent over a specialized team to treat Algeri-
an President Houari Boumedienne.142  By 1995, a dozen Chinese 
teams, employing 183 people, had completed one or two-year mis-
sions in Algeria.143  At present, Chinese medical teams can be found 
in Algiers, Annaba, Setif, Batna, El Kala and other major Algerian 
cities.144  The capital also boasts an acupuncture clinic staffed by 
Chinese doctors.145 
But Algeria is the tip of the iceberg.  Since the 1963 mission, 
China has dispatched 17,000 medical personnel to forty-eight African 
nations, treating some 200 million Africans.146  Presently, over 1,000 
 
Botswana, as well as various upgrades. 
 138. ICESCR, supra note 124, art. 12. 
 139. Id., art. 12(d). 
 140. Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 44, art. 3(3). 
 141. HU JINSHAN, FEIZHOUDE ZHONGGUO XINGXIANG [AFRICAN IMAGES OF CHINA] 197 
(2010). 
 142. Id. at 198. 
 143. Id. at 197. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Ronald Ssekandi, China’s Medical Aid Benefits 48 African Countries, XINHUA 
(Feb. 22, 2012), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2012-02/22/c_131423681.htm; 
Li Anshan, Zhongguo Yuanwai Yiliaodui de Lishi, Guimo jiqi Yingxiang [Chinese Medical 
Teams Abroad:  Their History, Scope and Influence], WAIJIAO PINGLUN [FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
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Chinese citizens in fifty medical teams serve in forty African nations, 
including surgeons, internalists, gynecologists, anesthesiologists and 
practitioners of traditional Chinese medicine.147  Chinese doctors 
practice not only in major cities like Algiers and Dakar, but also in 
some of the most underserved areas of Africa.148  While many West-
ern doctors stay close to the wealthier or more comfortable urban ar-
eas, Chinese doctors serve the poorest regions in Africa, such as Lu-
mina, Democratic Republic of Congo,149 Labe, Guinea,150 or Jinja, 
Uganda.151  Indeed, many Chinese teams provide the only medical 
treatment available in many parts of the continent.152 
In addition to sending medical personnel, China has also 
spent considerable sums to build permanent physical structures in Af-
rica.  China has built or helped build thirty hospitals in various Afri-
can countries,153 including the Central African Republic, Guinea-
Bissau and Chad.154  Such facilities further expand local people’s ac-
cess to medicine, an issue that continues to plague millions of Afri-
cans.  China has also built thirty malaria prevention centers, and 
pledged 500 million renminbi (roughly eighty million dollars) of an-
ti-malarial drugs and equipment to various African countries.155  
 
REVIEW] (Jan. 2009), at 25, 32. 
 147. See HU, supra note 141, at 198; see also Embassy of the People’s Republic of 
China in the Republic of Botswana, Implementation of Follow-up Actions of the Beijing 
Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, http://bw.china-embassy.org/eng/ 
xwdt/t461546.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2013).  
 148. See CTR. FOR CHINESE STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF STELLENBOSCH, EVALUATING 
CHINA’S FOCAC COMMITMENTS TO AFRICA AND MAPPING THE WAY AHEAD (Jan. 2010), 
available at http://www.ccs.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/ENGLISH-Evaluating-
Chinas-FOCAC-commitments-to-Africa-2010.pdf.  This valuable report attempts to monitor 
China’s progress on meeting its various commitments to African countries announced at the 
triennial Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). 
 149. HU, supra note 141, at 199. 
 150. Hu Yongqi & Cui Jia, Chinese Medical Teams Kindle Hearts in Guinea, CHINA 
DAILY (Sept. 22, 2010), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-09/22/content_113377 
20.htm. 
 151. HU, supra note 141. 
 152. Id. at 198. 
 153. Lu Hui, President Hu:  Important Progress Made in Realizing China-Africa New 
Strategic Partnership, XINHUA (July 19, 2012), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/ 
2012-07/19/c_131725431.htm. 
 154. State Council Information Office, White Paper:  China’s Foreign Aid, CHINA 
DAILY, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2011-04/22/content_12373944.htm (last updated 
Apr. 22, 2011). 
 155. See Interview with His Excellency Mr. Gu Xiaojie, Ambassador of China, on Sino-
Africa and Sino-Ethiopia Cooperation in Fighting Malaria, EMBASSY OF THE PEOPLE’S 
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Support for malaria is especially valuable, as it kills one million Afri-
can children every year, and infects hundreds of millions of Afri-
cans.156  China also sends teams to educate African medical workers 
on the prevention and diagnosis of malaria.157 
C. Education 
Education has been a central plank of the human rights plat-
form for the entirety of the postwar period.  The Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, though not binding, proclaimed that elemen-
tary education should be free and compulsory, and higher education 
should be “equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.” 158  Later, 
the ICESCR recognized “the right of everyone to education,” and 
bound states parties to provide free and compulsory primary educa-
tion, “generally available” secondary education and higher education 
that is equally accessible to all.159  Despite these guarantees, it is un-
clear how many Africans actually enjoy this right.  A lack of quali-
fied teachers, classrooms and learning materials has conspired to 
make primary school enrollment in African countries “among the 
lowest in world.” 160 
One of the keys to China’s own rise, particularly in the past 
decade, has been its investment in education.  In Africa, too, China 
stresses the importance of education and training in its assistance 
programs.  Across the continent, China has built over 100 schools, 
and established twenty-nine Confucius Institutes in twenty-two coun-
tries.161  The latter propagate Chinese culture, but also provide in-
struction in Mandarin, fast becoming the world’s second lingua fran-
ca after English.  Chinese and African universities have also entered 
into cooperative agreements to facilitate the exchange of ideas and 
research.  China has paid special attention to higher education, 
providing an eighty million dollar loan on favorable repayment 
terms, and a significant amount of labor and materials, to Malawi to 
 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA (Mar. 17, 2011), 
http://et.china-embassy.org/eng/zagx/t807396.htm. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. UDHR, supra note 123, art. 26(1). 
 159. ICESCR, supra note 124, art. 13(1), 13(2)(a)–(c). 
 160. African Education Initiative, USAID, http://transition.usaid.gov/locations/sub-
saharan_africa/initiatives/aei.html (last updated Dec. 30, 2011). 
 161. See Lu, supra note 153. 
6. Webster - Final Setting (51-3) (Do Not Delete) 5/17/2013  9:56 AM 
658 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [51:626 
build a University of Science and Technology.162 
China has also contributed to the human development of Af-
rican people.  In its half-century of bilateral relations, China has 
trained some 40,000 Africans across various sectors, and provided 
scholarships to 20,000 Africans to study in the PRC.163  The number 
of scholarships has increased gradually in the past several years, from 
2,000 in 2006, to 5,500 in 2012.164  China has recently reduced the 
number of undergraduate scholarships available to African students, 
and raised the number for master and doctoral studies.165  These 
funds help ensure an important sector of the African elite under-
stands, and perhaps feels some gratitude towards, China.  That is, 
such initiatives capture both minds and hearts. 
D. Food and Water 
As noted above, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the ICESCR both guarantee the right to an adequate standard of 
living, and specifically provide for the right to food.166  The right to 
water has a far more recent provenance, recognized only in 2010,167 
even as water is obviously vital to the creation, sustenance and prop-
agation of life itself.  Despite their status as fundamental human 
rights, however, food and water elude millions of Africans; obtaining 
sufficient quantities of both has long proven an intractable problem.  
This condition is frequently exacerbated by drought, war, corruption 
and the difficulties of coordinating responses by the international 
community.  One million Ethiopians died in 1984, and major famines 
have recurred in African countries from Angola and Malawi to So-
 
 162. Clemence Manyukwe, Malawi:  China to Fund New Science University, 
UNIVERSITY WORLD NEWS (June 6, 2010), http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php? 
story=20100605065149374; Malawi:  President Donates Land for Science University, FACE 
OF MALAWI (Apr. 24, 2011), http://www.faceofmalawi.com/2011/04/malawi-president-
donates-land-for-science-university. 
 163. See Lu, supra note 153. 
 164. Li Wei, China’s Exchanges and Scholarships with Africa:  History, Success and 




 165. Id. 
 166. See UDHR, supra note 123, art. 25(1); ICESCR, supra note 124, art. 11(1). 
 167. See The Human Right to Water and Sanitation, G.A. Res. 64/292, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/64/292 (Aug. 3, 2010). 
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mali, Chad and Niger.168  Agricultural production offers one signifi-
cant way to lower the likelihood of the next famine, while boosting 
the health and longevity of this generation of Africans. 
To meet some of these demands, China has built twenty agri-
cultural demonstration centers throughout Africa, and regularly dis-
patches agronomists to advise on raising agricultural productivity.169  
In Senegal, for example, Chinese agronomists have introduced rice 
cultivation techniques, and new strains of rice through a pilot pro-
gram with the Senegalese Ministry of Agriculture.170  According to 
Chinese sources, three pilots set up along the Senegal River tested 
two strains of rice and various cultivation techniques, which yielded 
between two to three times the quantity of rice as local varieties and 
techniques.171  The Chinese then train local farmers in the new culti-
vation techniques, and will probably sell them seeds, perhaps at a 
discounted price.  China’s presence could very well double or triple 
rice productions for Senegalese, but China will eventually be paid for 
its efforts.  But it is also important to note that this will ultimately be 
a commercial enterprise.  China is not doing charity work in Africa; 
this is no mission civilisatrice.  Rather, China hopes to develop new 
markets for products it is developing; these demonstration stations 
allow local scientists, farmers and officials to taste, and test, the 
wares before deciding to purchase. 
Access to clean drinking water likewise plagues many on the 
continent.  With the Sahara Desert covering nearly one-quarter of its 
land, Africa is among the driest continents.  Periodic droughts—
Ethiopia in the 1980s, Niger and Mali in the 2000s—have exacerbat-
ed this aridity, and led to the starvation and deaths of millions of Af-
ricans.  Even in sub-Saharan Africa, clean water remains a scarce 
natural resource. 
 
 168. Henry Foy, Millions Face Starvation in West Africa, Warn Aid Agencies, 
GUARDIAN (June 21, 2010, 7:26 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/21/ 
millions-face-starvation-west-africa (noting 10 million people faced starvation in Niger, 
Chad and other countries); Michael Fleshman, Millions Threatened with Starvation: UN 
Appeals for Emergency Relief for Southern Africa, AFRICA RECOVERY, Sept. 2002, at 3 
(noting that nearly sixteen million in seven countries were at risk in 2002); Africa Starvation 
Warning, BBC NEWS (Apr. 21, 1999, 10:42 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/ 
325543.stm (describing the risk of starvation in Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sierra Leone, 
Angola and the Great Lakes region in 1999). 
 169. See Liu & Qiu, supra note 128. 
 170. See Zhongguo Yuanzhu Saineijiaer Zhuanjia “Pao” Chu Shuidao Gaochan [China 
Aids Senegalese Experts to Throw a High Rice Yield], ALIBABA NEWS (Nov. 23, 2009), 
http://info.china.alibaba.com/detail/1007813934.html. 
 171. The Chinese strains produced an average of ten tons per hectare, while local strains 
produced three to five tons. 
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Since the first team was sent to Tanzania in 1965, Chinese 
engineers have drilled some 4,000 water-wells in twenty African 
countries.172  Not every well leads inexorably to a stable water sup-
ply, yet many African villagers can thank China for relatively secure 
access to water.  In the early 1970s, for instance, Mauritania request-
ed Chinese assistance in building wells.  The Chinese built eighteen 
wells, as well as a fifty-six kilometer piping system, to bring water to 
the 800,000 inhabitants of Nouakchott.173  Later in the 1970s, after 
signing a bilateral agreement with Nigeria, China sent twenty-seven 
engineers to dig dozens of wells in the northwest part of the country, 
near the basin of Lake Chad.174  Even now, Nigeria continues to wel-
come Chinese engineers, who have built 220 hand-drawn wells, and 
seven electric wells, since 2005.175  Under a 2004 bilateral agree-
ment, China will build 598 wells in Nigeria, for 180 local govern-
ments spread out across all eighteen provinces, as well as in its four 
administrative capitals.176  Even in Darfur, where temperatures regu-
larly exceed 100-degrees, Chinese peacekeepers have drilled a well 
to provide water for members of the joint African Union/United Na-
tions peacekeeping mission.177  Finding water in such an environ-
ment is, of course, both a humanitarian and human rights concern. 
E. Response to Professor James Thuo Gathii 
During President Nixon’s 1971 visit to China, Nixon asked 
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai about the impact of the 1789 French 
Revolution.  “Too early to tell,” Zhou reputedly answered, outlining 
a historical horizon far longer than most Westerners would probably 
accept.178  Professor Gathii, in his response to my article, makes a 
similar assessment about the human rights impact of China’s pres-
 
 172. HU, supra note 141, at 194.  
 173. Id. at 195. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 196. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Sudan, Darfur:  Chinese Peacekeepers’ Well Drilling Team, WASH NEWS AFRICA 
(July 25, 2012), http://washafrica.wordpress.com/2012/07/25/sudan-darfur-chinese-peace 
keepers-well-drilling-team. 
 178. Richard McGregor, Zhou’s Cryptic Caution Lost in Translation, FIN. TIMES (June 
10, 2011, 8:03 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/74916db6-938d-11e0-922e-00144feab4 
9a.html.  Zhou’s response has long been interpreted in the West to “buttress China’s 
reputation as a far-thinking, patient civilization.”  Id.  Recently, however, the historical 
record has been clarified.  Zhou was evidently referring to the 1968 Paris Riots, events that 
unfolded just three years prior to President Nixon’s visit.  Id. 
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ence in Africa.179  It is simply too soon to conclude whether China is 
actually advancing the cause of human rights in Africa.  While I ap-
preciate his penetrating critique, and concur with much of what he 
writes, I would like to offer three clarifications in response. 
First, Professor Gathii expresses concern about the “long-
term sustainability” of China’s contributions to human rights in Afri-
ca, suggesting that my analysis focuses solely on short-term im-
provements.  But as I showed in Parts III and IV, China has worked 
on African infrastructure projects for over four decades.  The Tanzam 
railroad suggests that projects can be at once monumental, revolu-
tionary in their day and still functional some thirty-five years later.  
True, the longevity of current projects is unknowable at the present 
moment.  But I would argue that the responsibility for the long-term 
effects of a road, power plant, well, school or other structure cannot 
be pinned solely on the Chinese side.  Africans too must accept re-
sponsibility for ensuring the continued operability of these tools.  
While China must train African personnel on the use and mainte-
nance of these various projects, the onus for the long-term sustaina-
bility of these projects ultimately falls on Africa, not China.  Again, 
comparison with China’s recent history is helpful.  China has moved 
very quickly up the value chain in its manufactures over the past 
three decades, not because Western companies voluntarily handed 
over valuable technology and trade secrets, but because China’s laws 
and regulations required transfer technology.  African countries 
should follow suit. 
Second, Professor Gathii writes that I deploy an “extremely 
low baseline to establish the effect of China’s presence in Africa.”180  
I do not disagree.  Indeed, the discursive space in which I write pays 
virtually no attention to the benefits of China’s presence in Africa.  
By describing some of these benefits, and placing them within a wid-
er human rights framework, I seek to challenge widely accepted veri-
ties that China is a colonizer and drain on Africa’s natural resources.  
In pushing the needle ever so slightly, I hope that future treatments of 
the Sino-African issues can avoid the self-serving dualism that China 
is a reckless exploiter, and the West offers Africa its best hope of de-
velopment.  The baseline is low primarily because I am writing in a 
discursive vacuum. 
Third, Professor Gathii rightly points out that China’s inter-
state relations are statist, ignoring or overlooking civil society groups 
 
 179. See Gathii, supra note 26, at 666. 
 180. Id. at 667. 
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and other non-state actors.181  Since, as Gathii states, Africa’s leader-
ship does not often act with the interests of most Africans in mind, 
there is the distinct possibility that Chinese support will benefit elites, 
but not the overwhelming majority of Africans.  I share this concern, 
and have elsewhere written about the important work that Chinese 
lawyers, activists and other civil society actors do in challenging 
Chinese authorities on human rights matters.182  Yet it is undeniable 
that civil society remains weak and fragmented in China.  The little 
influence it wields is unlikely to be felt on distant shores; authoritari-
an states such as China discourage challenges on their own soil, and 
are unlikely to cede their monopoly on power in the foreign context.  
In sum, Africans will need to ensure that China’s developmental as-
sistance is well deployed by selecting leaders to represent their inter-
ests.  Yet since few African states are fully democratic, this is an un-
likely prospect.183 
CONCLUSION 
China’s engagement with fifty African countries extends far 
beyond aiding and abetting the least savory regimes.  In the 1950s, 
China first gained a foothold in the continent through small aid pro-
jects in thirty-six countries.  In the past ten years, China has played 
an increasingly visible role throughout the continent, across a wide 
range of fields, from building schools and malaria centers to con-
structing roads and hydroelectric power plants.  While China does 
not use the banner of human rights to trumpet its rice experimenta-
tion centers, medical teams or water wells, these projects have helped 
raise the living standards, and secure the fundamental human rights, 
of millions of Africans.  Just as China’s unique, state-centric model 
of development has brought hundreds of millions of its own citizens 
out of poverty, its projects in Africa promise to do the same for Afri-
cans.  To be sure, China’s support for a small number of “rogue 
states” has thwarted international sanctions, and Western plans to 
isolate these regimes.  While unfortunate, such support is largely un-
representative of China’s Africa footprint, which covers a much 
 
 181. Id. at 677. 
 182. See Timothy Webster, Ambivalence and Activism:  Employment Discrimination in 
China, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 643 (2011). 
 183. See Freedom in the World 2012:  The Arab Uprisings and Their Global 
Repercussions, FREEDOM HOUSE, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/ 
freedom-world-2012 (last visited Mar. 25, 2013) (classifying six African states as “free,” 
twenty-two as “partly free,” and twenty-two as “not free”).  
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broader area than these conflict-ridden regimes.  Perhaps it is now 
time to consider whether China’s models, activities and counterex-
amples can teach the West something that our own decades of devel-
opmental experience, following centuries of colonialism, have failed 
to illuminate. 
 
